【光华讲坛】Do short-sellers mitigate or
发布时间:2018-05-17 查看次数:

光华讲坛暨现代会计学术沙龙第106

 

 题:Do short-sellers mitigate or exacerbate analysts’ disincentives to disclose bad news?

主讲人:University of Texas at Austin  赵武阳 助理教授

主持人:西南财经大学会计学院  陈磊 副教授

  间:2018518日(星期五)下午1330-1500

  点:西南财经大学柳林校区通博楼D301会议室

  办:会计学院  科研处

 

主讲人简介:

赵武阳,现任McCombs School of BusinessUniversity of Texas at Austin助理教授。2017年获得多伦多大学Rotman School of Management会计学博士。复旦大学工商管理学士以及管理学博士。主要研究方向包括Short Selling, Financial Analysts, Valuation。曾获得CMU Mini Conference “Emerging Scholar” FinalistBest Paper Award for GMU Conference on Investor Protection, Corporate Governance, and Fraud Prevention等学术奖项。曾在FARSCAR Conference, PCAOB/JAR Conference, AAA annual meeting等学术会议, 以及在LBSColumbiaNTUNUSBC、复旦等大学宣讲论文。

Publications

“Third Party Consequences of Short-selling Threats: The Case of Auditor Behavior” with Ole-Kristian Hope and Danqi Hu. 2017. Journal of Accounting and Economics 63(2-3): 479-498.

“Blockholder Exit Threats in the Presence of Private Benefits of Control” with Ole-Kristian Hope and Han Wu. 2017. Review of Accounting Studies 22: 873-902.

“Market Reactions to the Closest Peer Firm’s Analyst Revisions” with Ole-Kristian Hope. Accounting and Business Research, forthcoming.

 

论文摘要:

This study examines whether the presence of short-sellers mitigates or exacerbates analysts’ disincentives to disclose negative information. We find that when short-selling potential (measured by lendable shares) is higher, analysts are less likely to self-select to initiate coverage on firms for which they have relatively favorable news and to drop firms for which they have relatively unfavorable news. This negative relation between short-selling potential and analysts’ self-selection is stronger among firms where analysts’ disclosure of negative information spurs more short sales. Further instrumental variable test and analysis of the introduction of option listing provide evidence that this relation is causal. Additional tests show that higher short-selling potential reduces the return predictability of abnormal analyst coverage. Overall, our results support Hayes’s (1998) theoretical prediction that the presence of short-sellers mitigates analysts’ disincentives to disclose negative information.