• 【光华讲坛】Bank Institutions and Hidden Loan Loss: Evidence from Mandatory Shift to Expected Credit Loss Provisioning in China
    发布时间:2021-12-28 查看次数:

    光华讲坛


    主题:Bank Institutions and Hidden Loan Loss: Evidence from Mandatory Shift to Expected Credit Loss Provisioning in China

    (银行制度和隐藏贷款损失:基于中国预期信用损失拨备强制性转换的经验证据)

    主讲人: 中国人民大学商学院  汝 毅

    主持人: 西南财经大学 会计学院 田思杨

    时间: 2021年12月30日 上午 10:00-11:30

    举办地点:线上讲座   腾讯会议:993-164-416

    主办单位:会计学院  科研处

    主讲人简介:

    汝毅,中国人民大学商学院会计系讲师,清华大学经济管理学院会计学博士,美国哥伦比亚大学商学院访问学者,研究方向为媒体独立性、信息披露的外部性、银行监管和贷款决策等。研究成果发表于Review of Accounting Studies、《管理世界》《金融研究》《会计研究》《财经研究》等期刊。曾获得北京市优秀毕业生、清华大学优秀博士学位论文、清华大学研究生综合一等奖学金等荣誉。


    内容简介:

    We examine the effect of a mandatory shift to expected credit loss provisioning on banks’ loan loss recognition in China. We find that the mandatory shift increases loan loss provisions and the association between the provisions and expected credit risk among non-state-owned banks, especially those with overseas listing. In contrast, the mandatory shift has no effect on loan loss provisions among state-owned banks, and the non-compliance is driven by banks with high government subsidies or late-term governors. Additional analysis suggests that strong connections with assets management companies facilitate the non-compliance of state-owned banks. Further, the expected default risk of borrowers is similar between non-state-owned and state-owned banks, and institutional investors perceive an improvement in reporting quality only for non-state-owned banks following the mandatory shift. Overall, our results suggest that while market incentives can complement the mandatory shift to improve the informativeness of bank earnings to reflect risk, political incentives and government ownership negate the improvement and induce concealment of troubled loans.

    本文研究了预期信用损失拨备的强制性转换对中国商业银行贷款损失确认的影响。我们发现,强制性转换增加了非国有银行特别是境外上市银行的贷款损失准备金及其与预期信用风险的关联性。相比之下,强制性转换对国有银行的贷款损失拨备没有影响,这一不依从性是由拥有高额政府补贴或地方官员任期较晚的银行驱动。进一步分析表明,与资产管理公司的紧密联系助长了国有银行的不依从行为。此外,在强制转换之后非国有银行和国有银行借款人的预期违约风险相似,机构投资者认为只有非国有银行的报告质量有所改善。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,虽然市场激励可以作为强制性转换的补充以提高银行盈余反映风险的信息含量,但地方政治激励和政府所有权使得这种改善无效,并会导致对问题贷款的隐瞒。