14:00-15:00

报告25分钟

点评20分钟

提问15分钟

Supply   Chain Bargaining Power and Cost Stickiness

赵柄皓

（报告人）

杨奕楠

（点评人）

Abstract：Given the essential role of supply chains in the economy, furthering our understanding of the interactions between trade partners is important. In this paper, I   study the relation between cost stickiness and bargaining power over supply   chain partners. I document evidence consistent with the argument that firms   wield supply chain bargaining power to avoid cost stickiness by shifting high   adjustment costs onto their trade partners. In particular, I show that the   level of SG&A and COGS stickiness is negatively associated with firms’   bargaining power over their suppliers and customers. My results are robust to   using industry competition as an alternative measure of supply chain   bargaining power, therefore alleviating concerns about endogeneity. Moreover,   my results are robust to lead-and-lag tests, alternative measures of supply   chain bargaining power, inclusion of firm fixed effects, and among subsamples   examined in prior studies. Overall, my study offers insights into whether and   how supply chain relations influence firms’ cost stickiness behavior.

15:00-16:00

报告25分钟

点评20分钟

提问15分钟

授权理论与国有企业分类监管—基于地方国资委成立的准自然实验

胡宁

（报告人）

易阳

（点评人）

摘要：本文基于授权理论，以中国地方国资委成立为准自然实验，实证考察了地方国资委分类监管的策略及其经济后果。研究发现，地方国资委成立后，国资委对辖区国有企业授权意愿总体显著提升，但对竞争性行业和垄断性行业存在分类监管的特征，具体表现为：对竞争性国有企业强化放权，而对垄断性国有企业强化收权。基于不同的授权模式，不同类型的国企对经理人的考核也存在系统性差异：国资委成立后，竞争性国有企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感性提升，而垄断性国有企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感性下降。从监管效果来看，国资委成立后，辖区国有企业全要素生产率得到一定程度的提高。横截面测试表明，高质量的地方政府更能实现收权和放权的有机结合，改革效果也更好，而低质量的地方政府更可能采取“一刀切”的监管方式，无法产生预期的改革效果。本文基于中国国有企业监管实践，既丰富了授权理论的相关文献，也为进一步深化国有企业改革的实践提供了证据支持。

16:00-16:20

茶歇

16:20 - 17:20

报告25分钟

点评20分钟

提问15分钟

Geographical   Location and Regulatory Oversight: Evidence from China

何力

（报告人）

赵海龙

（点评人）

Abstract:   This study investigates the effect of   geographical distance on regulator’s review process over financial reporting.   Using hand-collected comment letter (CL) data from the Shanghai Stock   Exchange, we find that firms with headquarters that are located farther away   from the regulator are more likely to receive CLs and the review outcomes are   more substantive. Additional analyses using the propensity-score matched   sample and Tier-1 city sample are consistent with our main findings.   Moreover, our empirical results show that the effect of geographical   proximity on review process is more pronounced for firm with worse   information environment. We also find that the regulator is more likely to   use CL to point out firm’s accounting compliance or disclosure issues before   the news media when firms are located farther away from the regulator. Our   results suggest that the regulator uses the review process as a complementary   approach to mitigate the information asymmetry induced by geographical   distance.