• 【光华讲坛】Does employee social media influence CEO risk-taking incentives? Evidence from Glassdoor coverage (员工社交媒体是否影响CEO风险承担动机?来自于Glassdoor覆盖的证据)
    发布时间:2024-10-25 查看次数:

    光华讲坛


    主题:Does employee social media influence CEO risk-taking incentives? Evidence from Glassdoor coverage (员工社交媒体是否影响CEO风险承担动机?来自于Glassdoor覆盖的证据)

    主讲人:对外经济贸易大学 杨格

    主持人:西南财经大学 会计学院 华晨

    时间:2024-11-19 10:30-12:00

    会议地点:西南财经大学柳林校区诚正楼650

    主办单位:会计学院、科研处

    主讲人简介:

    杨格博士,现为对外经济贸易大学国际商学院财务管理学系助理教授。他毕业于新加坡国立大学,获金融学博士学位。主要研究方向为资本市场、公司财务、公司治理、金融不端行为。杨博士已经在多个国内外优秀期刊上发表论文。


    内容简介:

    我们研究了公司董事会在应对Glassdoor.com(一个收集和传播员工满意度评论的平台)报道时,对CEO薪酬结构进行的战略调整。通过利用首次在Glassdoor上发布评论的分阶段引入,我们采用了交叠双重差分的实证设计,发现CEO的投资组合vega在首次Glassdoor评论后显著增加。这一发现与在线员工评论促使CEO趋向风险规避的假设一致,促使董事会战略性地增加CEO的风险激励,以抵消这一影响。我们的分析显示,在员工评级较高、对人力资本依赖较低、财务表现优异或董事会更加稳定的公司中,投资组合vega的增长受到抑制。相反,在行业内评论数量较多、CEO任期较短或较年轻的公司中,这一效应则更为明显。我们的研究结果通过多种替代规格、指标和方法确认其稳健性,以应对潜在的内生性问题。总体而言,我们的结果提供了有力证据,表明董事会在制定高管薪酬方案时主动考虑在线员工评论对CEO风险偏好的影响,突显了员工社交媒体与公司治理实践之间的重要互动。


    We investigate the strategic adjustments made by corporate boards to CEO compensation structures in response to coverage by Glassdoor.com, a platform known for collecting and disseminating employee satisfaction reviews. Utilizing the staggered introduction of first-time reviews on Glassdoor, we employ a stacked difference-indifferences empirical design and find strong evidence that the CEO’s portfolio vega increases after the first Glassdoor review. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that online employee reviews pressure CEOs towards risk aversion, prompting boards to strategically increase CEOs’ risk-taking incentives to counteract this effect. Our analysis reveals that the observed increase in portfolio vega is attenuated in firms characterized by higher employee ratings, lower dependency on human capital, superior financial performance, or more entrenched boards. Conversely, the effect is amplified in firms with a higher number of industry peers reviewed on Glassdoor, less tenured CEOs, or younger CEOs. The robustness of our findings is confirmed through a broad array of alternative specifications, measures, and methodologies aimed at addressing potential endogeneity concerns. Overall, our results offer compelling evidence that boards proactively consider the influence of online employee reviews on CEOs’ risk preferences when crafting executive compensation packages, underscoring the critical interplay between employee social media and corporate governance practices.