会计学院Brownbag Seminar第一期

时间：2020.09.15（星期二） 11:00-12:30

地点:通博楼D301室

报告人：代婧

报告题目：Public Channels, Private Channels, and Firms’ Narrative Information Disclosure - Evidence from Narrative R&D Disclosure

摘要：Facing the trade-off between the costs of public disclosure and the benefits of information transparency, firms should cautiously disseminate their narrative R&D information. In this paper, we examine whether firms with more private information dissemination channels will reduce their public disclosure of narrative R&D information by investigating the effect of well-connected directors on firms’ narrative R&D disclosure quantity. Consistent with our expectations, we find that the firms with well-connected directors disclose less narrative R&D information. This association is more pronounced for firms that have: (1) higher litigation risk, (2) higher proprietary costs, (3) more chances to interact with directors at other firms, and (4) weaker corporate governance. Our results remain robust to employing the Universal Demand (UD) laws as a shock, investigating the narrative R&D details, using alternative measures for centrality, and controlling for additional factors. Collectively, our findings suggest that directors’ connections can substitute the public disclosure to the extent that they serve as a private channel of proprietary narrative R&D dissemination.

关键词：Narrative R&D Disclosure, Director Connections, Proprietary costs