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主题：Political Turnover and Audit Opinion: Evidence from China官员轮换和审计意见？基于中国市场的证据

主讲人：西南财经大学 会计学院 何苦

主持人：西南财经大学 会计学院 陈磊

时间：2021年11月9日 上午 11:00-12:30

举办地点：柳林校区通博楼D301会议室

主办单位：会计学院

主讲人简介：何苦，男，会计学博士，西南财经大学审计系副教授、硕士生导师。

内容简介：Political turnover is documented to either cause tremendous economic uncertainties or generate government officials a heightened incentive to conceal local negative information. In this study, we examine how political turnover influences auditor reporting behaviour and whether this influence varies among auditors. By employing the Chinese provincial governor turnover as research platform, we find that before political turnover, the likelihood of issuing Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs) for the Big 10 audit firms becomes significantly higher, whereas that for local small audit firms becomes substantially lower than that in other non-turnover years. We also find that the changes in auditor reporting behaviour would even be greater when client firms are more exposed to political influence or located in provinces where governors hold larger economic powers. Further evidence suggests that (1) firms have a lower reporting quality and higher financial costs in pre-turnover year; (2) the revelation of MAOs before political turnover substantially impedes governors’ career prospects; and (3) local small audit firms acquire larger market shares after governors get a promotion or lateral move. Overall, our study suggests that political turnover would drive auditors with a high level of independence to report more conservatively to manage the increasing uncertainties, while induce those closely tied to the government to report more aggressively to exchange for economic benefits.

摘要：以往研究发现官员轮换将导致巨大经济不确定性，同时也会使得被轮换官员产生压制当地负面消息的强烈动机。在本文中，我们研究了官员轮换对审计意见的影响，以及这种影响在不同事务所之间是否会产生差异。以中国省长论文为研究场景，我们发现在官员轮换之前，“十大”事务所将会出具更多的非标审计意见，而本地小所则更倾向于出具标准审计意见。我们也发现当企业受到政治影响越大，或者企业所在地的省长拥有更大的权力时，官员轮换对审计意见的影响将会更加显著。我们的进一步分析表明：（1）在官员轮换前，当地企业的会计信息质量更低，同时股权融资成本更高；（2）轮换前年度当地的非标意见显著阻碍了官员升迁；（3）当被轮换官员得到升迁或是平调时，本地小所的市场份额在官员轮换之后显著加大。总体而言，我们的研究表明在官员轮换之前，独立性较高的事务所将为了控制风险而变得更加保守，而和当地政府有紧密联系的事务所则会为了获取经济利益变得更加激进。