光华会计新才智论坛第三期
时 间:2024年6月18日(周二)13:30-16:00
地 点:柳林校区诚正楼731会议室、腾讯会议103-914-499
主持人:陈磊 教授(现代会计研究所所长)
时间:13:30-14:10
报告1:The Impact of Board Composition on ESG Reporting:A Text Mining Perspective
报告人:李奉珂(罗格斯大学)
摘要:In the contemporary business environment, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) reporting has emerged as an important element of corporate disclosure, reflecting a company's commitment to sustainable and ethical operations. However, the quality of ESG disclosures remains varied and lacks uniformity. This study aims to contribute to the understanding of factors influencing ESG reporting quality by employing text mining techniques to analyze the quality of ESG reports and their association with board characteristics. Using a sample of 3,449 ESG reports from U.S. public companies, this study finds that board size, board gender diversity and board sustainability committees have positive and significant impact on the firms’ Global Reporting Impact (GRI) adoption for the ESG reports. Board gender diversity and board sustainability committees have a positive and significant impact on the specificity and relevance of the ESG reports. The presence of sustainability committees is associated with a more pessimistic tone in ESG reports, suggesting higher report quality. Additionally, board size, board independence, and the presence of sustainability committees have a negative impact on the readability of the ESG reports. By employing a textual analysis approach, this study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between board characteristics and the qualitative aspects of ESG reporting. The insights contribute to a deeper understanding of the determinants of ESG disclosure quality, which is crucial for stakeholders' decision-making and the overall advancement of sustainable business practices.
时间:14:10-14:50
报告2:Unveiling the Promise:The Real Effects of Performance Commitment Contracts in M&As
报告人:刘铭(伦敦大学伯贝克学院)
摘要:While earnouts and performance commitment contracts (PCCs) are considered as value-creation signals due to their effectiveness in addressing information asymmetry and retaining top management teams of target companies during merger & acquisition (M&A) transactions, our empirical tests, based on hand-collected M&A data from 2008 to 2021 in China, show that PCCs actually impair acquirers' buy-and-hold-abnormal-returns (BHARs). Acquirers employing quasiearnouts achieve higher BHARs than those with PCCs, but they fall short of outperforming acquirers without PCCs. Effective acquirer monitoring helps alleviate the negative impacts of PCCs, especially when the distances between target firms and acquiring firms are geographically closer, reducing monitoring costs. Moreover, acquirers using PCCs achieve higher BHARs than acquirers without PCCs only when multiple metrics are utilized to assess target performance or when the metric less susceptible to manipulation is adopted. Overall, without measures to limit target managers' opportunistic behaviors, PCCs may lead to value destruction rather than value creation in China. Our findings highlight the importance of carefully considering the implications of PCCs in emerging markets with weak legal systems.