主题：Does Mandatory Disclosure Affect Labor Mobility? Evidence from SFAS 131强制信息披露会影响企业员工流动性吗？来自SFAS 131的证据

主讲人：香港中文大学 杨雨澄 助理教授

主持人：西南财经大学会计学院 李彦 副教授

时间：2025-09-23 10:30-12:00

地点：西南财经大学柳林校区诚正楼650

主办单位：新时代中国特色财务与会计理论创新与方法体系研究团队 数字经济重大基础理论与实践创新研究团队 会计学院 科研处

主讲人简介：

杨雨澄（Yucheng Yang）教授在罗切斯特大学（University of Rochester）获得博士学位，目前是香港中文大学会计学院助理教授，并担任会计学院本科项目（PACC）主任。杨雨澄教授的研究曾在发表在Journal of Accounting Research, The Accounting Review, Accounting, Organization and Society期刊，其研究方向为信息披露、公司治理、金融监管、金融中介行为、会计信息的宏观经济效应以及会计信息在资本市场以及劳动力市场的作用。

内容简介：

基于SFAS 131强制披露细分财务信息的政策背景，本讲座探讨了财务信息披露对劳动力市场流动性的影响及其作用机制。研究发现，SFAS 131显著降低了员工向竞争对手的流动，但对非竞争对手的流动无显著影响，表明这一结果与劳动力市场总体趋势无关。进一步分析表明，员工流动的减少源于细分财务信息替代了企业通过雇佣竞争对手员工获取专有信息的需求。特别是当竞争对手更多地获取披露企业的财务信息时，员工流动的减少更为显著，支持了公开信息渠道削弱了通过员工雇佣获取专有信息的动机假说。此外，流动减少在可能掌握专有财务信息的商业员工中更为明显，而在科学家和工程师中较弱，这一发现与SFAS 131主要替代了商业相关信息（而非技术信息）一致。研究还发现，受SFAS 131影响的员工晋升概率显著降低，反映了在竞争对手眼中，员工的信息价值下降。综上，本讲座揭示了强制信息披露通过信息替代机制对劳动力市场的重要影响，为理解信息披露与劳动力市场的交互作用提供了新视角。

The lecture focuses that SFAS 131, which required the disclosure of disaggregated financial information, led to a reduction in employee movement to competitors. In addition, we find that there is no change for employee movement to non-competitors, inconsistent with labor market trends explaining these patterns. Additional findings collectively suggest that the reduction in employee movement is driven by disaggregated financial information substituting the need for companies to hire competitors' employees to obtain proprietary information. Specifically, the reduction is more pronounced when competitors download the disclosing firm's financials more after SFAS 131, consistent with competitors consuming proprietary information via public sources, as opposed to through employee hiring. Moreover, the reduction is stronger among business employees who likely possess proprietary financial information as opposed to scientists and engineers, consistent with SFAS 131 substituting for business-related, instead of technological, information. In line with SFAS 131 reducing the informational value of employees to competitors, affected employees are significantly less likely to be promoted. Taken together, we document a novel link between mandatory disclosure and the labor market via their substitutive relationship in transferring proprietary information to competitors.