时 间：2025年12月3日（周三）14:00-16:40

地 点：柳林校区诚正楼645室、腾讯会议649-284-980

主持人：陈磊 教授（会计学院院长助理）

时间：14:00-14:40

报告1：The Effect of Customer Demand for Carbon Disclosures Along Supply Chains

报告人：邓瑾（香港科技大学）

摘要：This study examines how customer demand for suppliers’ carbon disclosures affects suppliers’ emissions performance. My analysis utilizes the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) Supply Chain program, in which participating customer firms request their suppliers disclose greenhouse gas (GHG) information. I find that compared to benchmark suppliers, treatment suppliers exposed to this program experience a decrease in Scope 1 emissions after their customers join the CDP Supply Chain program. These effects are more pronounced when customers have stronger incentives to monitor emissions performance along supply chains and have greater bargaining power, when suppliers face greater pressure to reduce emissions, and when there is greater information asymmetry between suppliers and customers. Further analyses reveal that treatment suppliers attract more customers and have more customers that are willing to publicly disclose their relationships. Participating customers are more likely to disclose upstream Scope 3 emissions, report a more granular breakdown of these emissions, and utilize more data from suppliers in their measurements. Overall, my findings underscore the role of customer demand for carbon disclosures in shaping sustainable behavior along the supply chain and in Scope 3 emissions reporting.

时间：14:40-15:20

报告2：Renegotiation Failure in Debt Contracting

报告人：张凯亮（复旦大学）

摘要：Although contract renegotiation is a crucial mechanism for reallocating control rights, prior literature has primarily focused on realized renegotiated outcomes, leaving the renegotiation process underexplored. Using a novel dataset of creditor voting from bondholder meetings, we examine the determinants and consequences of renegotiation failure in debt contracting. We document that more than 35% of renegotiations fail due to insufficient creditor participation or a lack of consensus among contracting parties. Second, we show that ex-ante coordination-intensive arrangements increase the likelihood of renegotiation failure by discouraging creditor engagement and amplifying voting disagreement, whereas ex-post risk perceptions reduce the likelihood of failure by motivating creditor engagement and facilitating consensus formation. Finally, we demonstrate that contracting parties strategically act to avoid costly renegotiation failures. Overall, we provide novel evidence on renegotiation failure and the mechanisms through which renegotiation reshapes contractual efficiency.

时间：15:20-16:00

报告3：Going Supranational: Anomaly-Market Links and New Dimensions of Market Efficiency

报告人：李嫣然（纽约城市大学巴鲁学院）

摘要：We connect cross-sectional anomalies to time-series market return predictability using data from 44 non-US countries. While a large set of representative anomaly returns shows limited predictive power for market returns at the country level, they exhibit strong predictability when aggregated to the supranational level. We establish the foundations of supranational aggregation by imposing an economically disciplined reduced form for the anomaly–market linkage that structures cross-country heterogeneity. Cross-sectional mispricing in one country informs market-wide mispricing in its linked countries, enhancing supranational return predictability, and potentially more so when mispricing is more country-specific than global. Guided by the framework, we develop three supranational market (in)efficiency measures—systemic mispricing, overpricing dominance, and price randomness—and empirically show that they govern the strength and nature of anomaly–to-market predictability across various supranational groups in the global market.

时间：16:00-16:40

报告4：Does a Market for Credit Protection Increase Employment Risk?

报告人：陈果（罗格斯大学）

摘要：This paper looks at the introduction of Credit Default Swap (CDS) and its effect on employment. CDS allows lenders to hedge their credit exposure, making them tough negotiators in default. This increases the firm’s likelihood of bankruptcy and increases employment risk, which leads to employee attrition. The presence of tough creditors also gives incentives to firms to follow conservative policies to mitigate the increased likelihood of distress. This disciplining effect also results in firms decreasing employment to contain operating costs. We find that growth in employment is 55% lower in the years after CDS trading relative to the unconditional mean in a matched sample. This decrease in employment is not accompanied by a decrease in capital expenditures. The lower employment growth is sustained over the long term and is predominantly in firms with high-yield debt. Firms with CDS trading are more likely to undertake efficiency-increasing layoffs, retain and hire more productive employees, and experience an increase in capital intensity along with increases in labor and total factor productivity.