光华讲坛

主题： Director Networks, Information Environment, and Corporate Investment

（董事网络、信息环境与公司投资）

主讲人： 郑悦，会计学博士，香港科技大学助理教授

主持人： 代婧，会计学博士，副教授，西南财经大学会计学院

时间：2021年11月16日上午 10:00-11:30

举办地点：腾讯会议421720938

主办单位： 会计学院

主讲人简介：郑悦，女，会计学博士，香港科技大学助理教授。

内容简介：We explore whether director connections improve the efficiency of a firm’s investment decisions by enhancing its external information environment. We find that board connectedness is negatively associated with the extent of investment inefficiency, with the effect being stronger for firms with higher information asymmetry. Subsample analyses suggest that board connectedness reduce both under- and overinvestment. Board connectedness mitigates underinvestment to a greater extent for firms with higher demand for external capital, and this effect is potentially driven by well-connected directors facilitating better access to equity financing. The effect of board connectedness on overinvestment is stronger for firms with higher agency costs and a greater presence of external monitors. These findings suggest that director networks serve as an information intermediary that provides important information to external capital providers and monitors, thereby mitigating underinvestment arising from capital constraints and overinvestment arising from agency problems.

摘要：本文探讨了董事关系是否通过增强外部信息环境来提高公司投资决策的效率。我们发现董事会关系与投资效率低下的程度呈负相关，并在信息不对称程度较高的公司中更加显著。子样本的分析表明，董事会关系既能减少投资不足，也能减少投资过度。对于外部融资需求较高的公司，董事会关系会在更大程度上缓解投资不足，这种影响可能是由于关系良好的董事能提供更好的股权融资渠道。对于代理成本较高和外部监督者较多的公司，董事会关系对过度投资的影响更大。这些发现表明，董事网络作为信息中介，向外部资本提供者和监督者提供重要信息，从而减轻由于资本约束引起的投资不足和由于代理问题引起的投资过度。