光华讲坛暨现代会计学术沙龙（第九十七期）

主题：Internalizing Governance Externalities: The Role of Institutional Cross-ownership

报告人：赵山副教授（法国格勒诺布尔（Grenoble）管理学院金融系）

主持人：曹春方副教授（西南财经大学会计学院）

时间：2017年7月18日（周二），14:00~15:30

地点：弘远楼109

主办：西南财经大学会计学院，科研处

诚邀各位老师和同学参加！

报告人简介：赵山，法国格勒诺布尔（Grenoble）管理学院金融学副教授。他的主要研究领域聚焦于公司金融和公司治理。其研究成果发表于世界顶尖学术期刊如Review of Financial Studies （金融学世界3大学术期刊）和Strategic Management Journal （战略学世界顶级学术期刊），Journal of Banking and Finance（金融学世界前10学术期刊）和Journal of International Money and Finance（金融学世界前15学术期刊）等。他曾荣获CICF（亚洲最高级的大型金融学术会议）2010年最佳论文奖，TCFA（全美华人金融学会）2014年最佳论文奖。他的论文在世界顶级金融学会议如美国金融学会年会（AFA），美国西部金融学会（WFA），欧洲金融学会年会（EFA）上被宣讲。他还担任一些国际知名经济金融学术期刊和科学基金会的匿名审稿人，包括Rand Journal of Economics，Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting， China Economic Review, China Economic Quarterly，以色列自然科学基金会等。他的学术研究被国内外媒体报道，包括Benzinga, Les Echos，彭博社（Bloomberg），哈佛大学公司治理论坛，哥伦比亚法学院论坛等。

内容简介：We analyze the role of institutional cross-ownership in internalizing corporate governanceexternalities using data on mutual fund proxy voting. Exploiting the variation in cross-ownershipacross institutions within a given proposal as well as the variation in cross-ownership across firmswithin a given institution’s portfolio, we show that an institution’s holdings in peer firms increasethe likelihood that the institution votes against management in shareholder-sponsored governanceproposals. This relation is stronger for firms whose managers are likely to have more outsideopportunities. Consistent with a causal interpretation of our results, we find that increases in cross-ownership induced by financial institution mergers lead to a higher likelihood that the acquirerinstitution votes against management. We further show that high aggregate cross-ownershippositively predicts management losing a vote. Overall, our evidence suggests that institutionalcross-ownership improves governance by alleviating the inefficiency resulting from corporategovernance externalities.