现代会计学术沙龙（第七十二期）

主题：Disguised Corruption: Evidence from Consumer Credit in China

主讲人：新加坡国立大学商学院钱文澜助理教授

主持人：西南财经大学会计学院陈磊助理教授

时间：3月26日（星期四）下午 3：30-5：00

地点：西南财经大学柳林校区通博楼D207会议室

主办：会计学院科研处

诚邀各位老师和同学参加！

主讲人简介：

钱文澜，博士，新加坡国立大学商学院助理教授。2008年获加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校（UC Berkeley）博士学位。现任Real Estate Economics杂志副主编。

研究领域为家庭金融、房地产金融、资产市场中的信息的产生以及传递过程。已有多篇文章被Journal of Financial Economics、American Economic Review、Real Estate Economics、Journal of Real Estate Economics and Finance等期刊发表或接收。

主持人简介：

陈磊，荷兰马斯特里赫特大学金融学博士，英国伦敦政治经济学院博士后，2014年起任西南财经大学会计学院助理教授。

研究领域为公司治理，金融市场做空，财务造假，高管独董。已在Journal of Business Ethics等期刊发表论文。

论文摘要：

Disguised Corruption:Evidence from Consumer Credit in China

We investigate a disguised form of corruption using a unique and comprehensive sample of credit card data in China. We document that bureaucrats—defined as those working in the government—receive 13% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics. Despite the higher credit lines, bureaucrats’ credit card accounts experience a higher delinquency rate and subsequently a higher likelihood of reinstatement—indicating their debt being forgiven by the bank. Such patterns in consumer credit provision and outcomes are concentrated among bureaucrats with greater power and in more corruptive areas. The bank branches associated with a greater bureaucrat credit line premium receive more deposits from the local government. Non-bureaucrat consumers in areas with a greater bureaucrat credit line premium, on the other hand, receive significantly lower credit lines.