主题：How does double rent-seeking between government and auditors influence audit quality? Evidence from auditors’ personal political connections in China
主讲人：澳大利亚Macquarie University 田钢（Gary Tian）教授
主持人：西南财经大学会计学院吉利教授
时间：2015年12月14日（星期一）上午10：00-11：30
地点：西南财经大学柳林校区通博楼D207会议室
主办：会计学院科研处
诚邀各位老师和同学参加！
主讲人简介：
Gary (Gang) Tian is Professor and Chair of Department of Actuarial Studies and Applied Finance, School of Business and Economics in Macquarie University, Australia. His area of research interests includes CEO compensation/turnover, Political connections, social network and corporate policy, Ownership-control divergence, state ownership and family control, IPOs and private equity, Bank relationship and lending decisions and Intraday data, liquidity and volatility patterns. He has published papers in journals including Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, European Accounting Review, Pacific Basin Finance Journal, International Review of Finance, International Review of Financial Analysis and etc.
内容摘要：
In this study, we examine how government and individual auditors seek rents from each other through the auditors’ political connections and how this double rent-seeking influences audit quality. We hypothesize that government is more likely to intervene in the audit process of politically connected auditors, but at the same time also provides them with protection from sanctions. By employing 3465 audits in the Chinese market between 2008 and 2013, we document that compared with their non-connected counterparts, auditors with political connections have a significantly lower probability of issuing modified audit opinions to SOEs. In addition, we also find a negative association between auditors’ political connections and the possibility of regulatory sanctions being imposed on them. Moreover, the effect of politicalconnections is more pronounced when other auditors from the same audit firm are also connected to government. Further studies suggest that the rent-seeking activities between government and politically connected auditors are less severe in developed regions, having adopted LLP system and for engage partners. In summary, our study suggests that auditors’ political connections incur heavier government interventions, yet also provide political protection.
